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The Nation, the State, and the First
Industrial Revolution
Julian Hoppit
T
he nation-state has long offered a powerful framework within which
to understand modern economic growth. To some it provides “a natural
unit in the study of economic growth,” especially when measuring such
growth; to many others states have often signiﬁcantly inﬂuenced the performance
of their economies.
1 On this second point Barry Supple observed that “frontiers
are more than lines on a map: they frequently deﬁne quite distinctive systems of
thought and action. The state is, of course, pre-eminently such a system.”
2 In the
British case, however, national frontiers have long been highly distinctive, as has
recently been made plain by the “new British history” and work by political sci-
entists on devolution since 1997.
3
By exploring patterns of the use of legislation for economic ends, this article
considers the implications of such distinctiveness for the relationship between the
nation-state and Britain’s precocious economy between 1660 and 1800. The focus
is mainly upon legislation at Westminster, but comparisons are also made with
enactments at Edinburgh and Dublin to enrich the account. It is argued that if
Julian Hoppit is Astor Professor of British History at University College London.
1 Simon Kuznets, “The State as a Unit of Economic Growth,” Journal of Economic History 11, no.
1 (Winter 1951): 25–41. Work within the regional and global frameworks in recent decades has pointed
up the limitations of an exclusive use of the nation as the unit of assessment and analysis. A very useful
summary of the regional approach is provided in Pat Hudson, ed., Regions and Industries: A Perspective
on the Industrial Revolution in Britain (Cambridge, 1989). For a recent global approach, see R. C.
Allen, The British Industrial Revolution in Global Perspective (Cambridge, 2009).
2 Barry Supple, “The State and the Industrial Revolution, 1700–1914,” in The Fontana Economic
History of Europe, ed. C. M. Cipolla (London, 1971), 3:5.
3 There is a very large literature here, but see particularly: J. G. A. Pocock, The Discovery of Islands:
Essays in British History (Cambridge, 2005); Linda Colley, Britons: Forging the Nation, 1707–1837
(New Haven, CT, 1992); Steven G. Ellis and Sarah Barber, eds., Conquest and Union: Fashioning a
British State, 1485–1725 (Harlow, 1995); Glenn Burgess, ed., The New British History: Founding a
Modern State, 1603–1715 (London, 1999); David Eastwood and Laurence Brockliss, eds., A Union of
Multiple Identities: The British Isles, c. 1750–c. 1850 (Manchester, 1997); Iain McLean and Alistair
McMillan, State of the Union: Unionism and the Alternatives in the United Kingdom since1707(Oxford,
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some legislation sought to affect the British economy as a whole, the practical
application of such legislation often varied between England, Scotland, and Wales.
Similarly, public funds, usually with legislative underpinnings, were spent to de-
velop the economies of Ireland and Scotland more directly than was the case in
England and Wales. Moreover, such general measures existed alongside many
thousand very particular ones, established at the behest of speciﬁc propertied
interests, that penetrated deep into the interstices of the domestic economy. Here,
however, such English interests utilized legislative authority much more readily
than their Scottish or Welsh counterparts. Generally the relationship between na-
tion, state, and the ﬁrst industrial revolution lacked all the clarity one would expect
of a composite multinational polity operating amid an unanticipated epochal
change.
4 That relationship was multifaceted and multilayered, but it also operated
differently from one nation to the next within Britain. It may be that such variations
in the relationship between political power and economic change is what distin-
guished the British case, not merely the advent of constitutional monarchy or a
heightened attachment to “liberty.” This raises doubts about reminted Whig or
celebratory accounts of British history promulgated over the past quarter century
and incidentally of Britain’s supposed exemplary history.
The article begins by considering brieﬂy some of the main broad arguments
that have been made about the relationship between the British nation-state and
industrialization, including the new Whig accounts. Some national variations in
the experience of economic change are then suggested. The heart of the article
lies in various counts of patterns of parliamentary legislation relating to economic
matters in the period, which leads to a summary of the efforts made at the time
to improve “national” economies. Finally, the article concludes by considering the
implications of national variations in British practical political economy.

The existing literature on the relationship between the state and the economy
in Britain between 1660 and 1800 has typically not been much concerned with
the signiﬁcance of nationhood, of similarities and differences in the experiences
of Britain’s three nations.
5 A range of ﬁne studies exists about particular instances
when the central state sought to inﬂuence the economy. Where they focus upon
largely local measures, such as enclosures and turnpike roads, understandably the
national dimension has been little considered. But even where scholars have ex-
amined legislation that was not locally orientated, they have not often engaged
with the national dimension. Fine work by Bob Harris and Patrick O’Brien and
4 By the “ﬁrst industrial revolution” I mean that Britain’s economy was transformed in ways that
involved a profound break with earlier economic arrangements and before other national economies.
The case for such a view, albeit with a focus on England, is made very clear in E. A. Wrigley, Energy
and the English Industrial Revolution (Cambridge, 2010).
5 For example, the ﬁne survey by Ron Harris largely ignores the national dimension: “Government
and the Economy, 1688–1850,” in The Cambridge Economic History of Modern Britain, ed. Roderick
Floud and Paul Johnson, 3 vols. (Cambridge, 2004), 1:204–37. Similarly, despite its title theinteresting
overview by Lars Magnusson is little concerned with what constituted nations: Nation, State and the
Industrial Revolution: The Visible Hand (London, 2009).THE NATION, THE STATE, AND THE FIRST INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION  309
his colleagues are unusual in doing so.
6 Similarly, it is often forgotten that John
Brewer’s brilliant study of the growth of the ﬁscal-military state concentrated on
England, not Britain, as its title made clear.
7 Even mercantilism, often viewed as
an expression of economic nationalism, has largely been studied with reference to
the English case before 1707 and seamlessly expanded to Britain thereafter. Al-
ternatively, English or British mercantilism is seen as having pursued the same
strategic objectives as French or Dutch mercantilism and, consequently, as not
nationally distinctive save at the tactical level.
8 Where national distinctions have
been drawn most fruitfully, especially by O’Brien, is in relation to the British state’s
success in raising revenue and waging war, helping in the process to underpin the
expansion of important export markets for British industrial goods.
9 But even here
Britain is not usually approached as a multinational polity, and the approach pays
little attention to the use of the state’s authority to aid growth generated do-
mestically within the important agricultural and service sectors.
The signiﬁcance of nationhood and the state to economic performance was, of
course, considered long and hard in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.
One strand of this was that in the eighteenth century foreigners began to expatiate
upon English exceptionalism (using England and Britain indiscriminately). For
example, Johann Archenholz, the Prussian soldier and historian who lived in En-
gland between 1769 and 1779, thought that “Great Britain, which cannot naturally
be considered, in the balance of Europe, but as belonging to the second order of
kingdoms, has been elevated to the rank of one of the ﬁrst powers in the world
by bravery, wealth, liberty, and the happy consequences of an excellent political
system.”
10 Like so many, he believed that England and Great Britain were syno-
nyms, with a single political system, introduced after the Glorious Revolution of
1688–89, experienced by all, and productive of power and prosperity across the
whole island. Anglomaniacs praised the emergence of stable, mixed government,
6 Bob Harris, Politics and the Nation: Britain in the Mid-Eighteenth Century (Oxford, 2002); Trevor
Grifﬁths, Philip Hunt, and Patrick O’Brien, “Scottish, Irish, and Imperial Connections: Parliament,
the Three Kingdoms, and the Mechanization of Cotton Spinning in Eighteenth-Century Britain,”
Economic History Review 61, no. 3 (August 2008): 625–50.
7 John Brewer, The Sinews of Power: War, Money and the English State, 1688–1783 (London, 1989).
As did other important general interpretations of state formation: Philip Corrigan and Derek Sayer,
The Great Arch: English State Formation as Cultural Revolution (Oxford, 1985); M. J. Braddick, State
Formation in Early Modern England, c. 1550–1700 (Cambridge, 2000).
8 For introductions to the large literature, see Jacob Viner, Studies in the Theory of International
Trade (New York, 1937); D. C. Coleman, ed., Revisions in Mercantilism (London, 1969); Lars Mag-
nusson, Mercantilism: The Shaping of an Economic Language (London, 1994); Istvan Hont, Jealousy
of Trade: International Competition and the Nation-State in Historical Perspective (Cambridge, MA,
2005).
9 For good summaries of his valuable approach, P. K. O’Brien, “The Britishness of the First Industrial
Revolution and the British Contribution to the Industrialization of ‘Follower Countries’ on the Main-
land, 1756–1914,” Diplomacy and Statecraft 8, no. 3 (November 1997): 48–67, and “Inseparable
Connections: Trade, Economy, Fiscal State, and the Expansion of Empire, 1688–1815,” in The Oxford
History of the British Empire, ed. W. R. Louis, 5 vols. (Oxford, 1998–2001), 2:54–77.
10 J. W. Archenholz, A Picture of England (London, 1789), 2:190; Michael Maurer, “Germany’s
Image of Eighteenth-Century England,” in Britain and Germany Compared: Nationality, Society and
Nobility in the Eighteenth Century, ed. Joseph Canning and Hermann Wellenreuther(Go ¨ttingen,2001),
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the extent of entrepreneurialism, and the ﬂexible and open nature of British
thought.
11
Such views sat easily enough with Herbert Butterﬁeld’s description of the Whig
interpretation of history: that England was a favored nation, which progressed
because of an attachment to liberty.
12 Such an interpretation was never as dominant
as is often supposed and by 1930 had been sufﬁciently challenged for W. C. Sellar
and R. J. Yeatman brilliantly to mock its glib pieties in 1066 and All That. But
historical fashions do sometimes go round in circles, and in the past quarter century
a number of prominent scholars and public ﬁgures have declaimed upon the sup-
posedly exceptional national aspects of economic change in England or Britain.
This has taken two main forms.
A few have emphasized the importance of nationhood, national identity, or
nationalism in explaining Britain’s early industrialization. David Landes has argued
that “Britain had the early advantage of being a nation...aself-conscious, self-
aware unit characterized by common identity and loyalty and by equality of civil
status.”
13 Liah Greenfeld, in a prizewinning (though controversial) book published
in 2001, took this further and argued that Britain’s “rise was in the nature of a
miracle” that is best explained by the fact that “Nationalism ﬁrst appeared in
England...which it was the only one to possess for some two centuries,” and
this appearance “liberated natural economic energies from the constraining tu-
telage of ethical considerations and social concerns, and therefore...d i dn o t
inhibit economic growth.”
14
Such views of nationhood tend to focus upon England or to elide distinctions
between England and Britain. Moreover, while Colley has shown some ways in
which ideas of Britishness developed after 1707, Graeme Morton has illustrated
the danger that “Whiggish principles of state formation have masked national
tensions which have never yet been eradicated.”
15 There was plenty of evidence
11 Paul Langford, “Introduction: Time and Space,” in The Eighteenth Century: 1688–1815, ed. Paul
Langford (Oxford, 2002), 9; Giorgio Riello and P. K. O’Brien, “Reconstructing the Industrial Rev-
olution: Analyses, Perceptions and Conceptions of Britain’s Precocious Transition to Europe’s First
Industrial Society,” LSE Working Papers in Economic History 84/04 (London School of Economics
and Political Science, Department of Economic History, London, 2004); Josephine Grieder, Anglo-
mania in France, 1740–1789: Fact, Fiction, and Political Discourse (Geneva, 1985); Franc ¸ois Crouzet,
Britain Ascendant: Comparative Studies in Franco-British Economic History (Cambridge, 1990), chap.
4; Robert Tombs and Isabelle Tombs, That Sweet Enemy: The French and the British from the Sun King
to the Present (New York, 2006), 84.
12 Herbert Butterﬁeld, The Whig Interpretation of History (London, 1931). English ideas of their
national exceptionalism were reasonably well developed by 1600; surveyed in Keith E. Wrightson,
“Kindred Adjoining Kingdoms: An English Perspective on the Social and Economic History of Early
Modern Scotland,” in Scottish Society, 1500–1800, ed. R. A. Houston and I. D. Whyte (Cambridge,
1989), 246–50.
13 David S. Landes, The Wealth and Poverty of Nations: or Why Some Are So Rich and Some So Poor
(New York, 1998), 219.
14 Liah Greenfeld, The Spirit of Capitalism: Nationalism and Economic Growth (Cambridge, MA,
2001), 22–24. Greenfeld considers English nationalism but British economic performance. There is a
ﬁne critical review of this book by Andre Wakeﬁeldin theJournalofModernHistory75,no.4(December
2003): 926–28. See also Liah Greenfeld’s Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity (Cambridge, MA,
1992).
15 Colley, Britons; Graeme Morton, Unionist-Nationalism: Governing Urban Scotland, 1830–1860
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in the eighteenth century of such tensions, but some also noted differences in the
intensity of national identity across the three kingdoms. In 1750, for example, Sir
James Lowther believed that the Irish and the Scotch “are both more national
than the English.”
16 After 1707 many English and Scots had different ideas of
what Britain was: most Scots saw themselves as both Scottish and British, but most
English made little distinction between England and Britain.
17 No less importantly,
Ireland, both as “other” and then, from 1801, as part of the United Kingdom,
further muddied the waters of national identity in Britain. Nationhood and national
identity in Britain have been so uncertain since at least the seventeenth century
that they are not concepts that can be employed to understand the emergence of
the ﬁrst industrial revolution in any reasonably testable way.
A second conventional argument about the national exceptionalism of the ﬁrst
industrial revolution has considered the implications of constitutional develop-
ments, along two main lines. At the most general level there are views such as
Thomas Sowell’s that Britain’s early economic transformation happened when it
did because Britain had established before almost everywhere else “a framework
of law and government that facilitated economic transactions,” particularly by
pioneering the establishment of “freedom.”
18 Yet, as David Armitage has noted,
“Though it has been argued that the Glorious Revolution represented the victory
of law, liberty and localism against absolutism, subordination and centralisation,
this perspective is only true of England and, possibly, the American mainland
colonies.”
19 The politics and teleology behind arguments such as Sowell’s are
highlighted in Gordon Brown’s identiﬁcation of a “golden thread” of liberty
running through British history, as well as the view of the then recently retired
Chairman of the Federal Reserve, Alan Greenspan, that the most “free” of the
leading modern economies “all have roots in Britain.”
20 Such views bring to mind
Condorcet’s warning of the dangers of circular reasoning, whereby “liberty will
be no more, in the eyes of an avid nation, than the necessary condition for the
security of ﬁnancial operations.”
21
The second line of constitutional exceptionalism has emphasized how the Glo-
rious Revolution led to a more powerful state that was better able to protect and
project the nation’s interests, while securing property rights at home in ways
16 Quoted in Christopher A. Whatley, Scottish Society, 1707–1830: Beyond Jacobitism, Towards In-
dustrialization (Manchester, 2000), 118.
17 T. C. Smout, “Problems of Nationalism, Identity and Improvement in Later Eighteenth-Century
Scotland,” in Improvement and Enlightenment, ed. T. M. Devine (Edinburgh, 1989), 5–8. See also
the works cited in n. 3 above.
18 Thomas Sowell, Conquests and Cultures: An International History (New York, 1998), 32, 87.
Similarly, Douglass C. North, “The Paradox of the West,” in The Origins of Modern Freedom in the
West, ed. R. W. Davis (Stanford, CA, 1995), 8.
19 David Armitage, “The Political Economy of Britain and Ireland after the Glorious Revolution,”
in Political Thought in Seventeenth Century Ireland: Kingdom or Colony,ed.JaneOhlmeyer(Cambridge,
2000), 231–32.
20 Brown noted this “golden thread” through British history since Magna Carta in speeches in 2006
and 2007. It is restated in his introduction to Gertrude Himmelfarb, The Roads to Modernity: The
British, French and American Enlightenments (London, 2008), xii. A critical view of Brown’s motives
is in Tom Nairn, Gordon Brown: Bard of Britishness (Cardiff, 2006). Alan Greenspan, The Age of
Turbulence: Adventures in a New World (New York, 2007), 276.
21 Quoted in Emma Rothschild, “Condorcet and the Conﬂict of Values,” Historical Journal 39, no.
3 (September 1996): 684.312  HOPPIT
conducive to capitalist enterprise.
22 For example, in an article that has been very
inﬂuential among some economic historians, economists, and political scientists,
D. C. North and Barry R. Weingast argue that the Glorious Revolution ﬁrmly
established property rights and balanced the interests of crown and parliament.
This led to the transformation of public ﬁnances, allowing Britain to rise as France
fell, so that “in 1765 France was on the verge of bankruptcy while England was
on the verge of the Industrial Revolution.”
23 In a similar vein, Niall Ferguson has
argued that Britain led the way in providing the best institutional arrangements
for the accumulation of power and wealth: “It was in the eighteenth century that
the British state developed the peculiar institutional combination of bureaucracy,
parliament, debt and bank that enabled Britain at once to empire-build and to
industrialize.”
24
Such approaches operate at a fairly high level of generalization, being concerned
with governmental measures only and are usually untroubled by whether the ex-
periences of England and Britain were one and the same under the revolution
constitution. On this latter point historians of Ireland and Scotland have naturally
been more inquisitive, exploring the implications for economic development in
those nations of the union of crowns of 1603 and, more particularly, the parlia-
mentary unions of 1707 and 1801. Such approaches have particularly considered
the consequences of the level and conditions of access to English or British do-
mestic and imperial markets before and after the unions, including the protection
afforded by British armed forces. These considerations are commonly weighed
against the importance of factors endogenous to Scotland and Ireland, including
the survival after union of institutions distinctive to both.
25 This article builds upon
such approaches by looking at patterns of parliamentary legislation that directly
related to the economy. But it is important to begin by recalling some broad
22 Such arguments build upon major studies of the growth of the British state’s power dating back
to Dickson. P. G. M. Dickson, The Financial Revolution in England: A Study in Public Credit,
1688–1756 (London, 1967); Peter Mathias and P. K. O’Brien, “Taxation in Britain and France,
1715–1810: A Comparison of the Social and Economic Incidence of Taxes Collected for the Central
Government,” Journal of European Economic History 5, no. 3 (Winter 1976): 601–50; Brewer,
Sinews of Power; N. A. M. Rodger, The Command of the Ocean: A Naval History of Britain, 1649–
1815 (London, 2004).
23 D. C. North and Barry R. Weingast, “Constitutions and Commitment: The Evolution of Insti-
tutions Governing Public Choice in Seventeenth-Century England,” Journal of Economic History 49,
no. 4 (December 1989): 830–31. They acknowledged, at 804 n. 1, that since they emphasize “the
problems the winners (the Whigs) sought to solve, it necessarily contains strong elements of ‘Whig’
history.”
24 Niall Ferguson, The Cash Nexus: Money and Power in the Modern World, 1700–2000 (London,
2001), 20.
25 For recent views of Scotland: Whatley, Scottish Society, especially chap. 3; T. M. Devine, “The
Modern Economy: Scotland and the Act of Union,” in The Transformation of Scotland: The Economy
since 1700, ed. T. M. Devine, C. H. Lee, and G. C. Peden (Edinburgh, 2005), 13–33. The economic
context of the Union negotiations have long been emphasized. See the references in two recent major
interpretations: C. A. Whatley and Derek J. Patrick, The Scots and the Union (Edinburgh, 2006); Allan
I. Macinnes, Union and Empire: The Making of the United Kingdom in 1707 (Cambridge, 2007). For
a penetrating review of these, see Bob Harris, “The Anglo-Scottish Treaty of Union, 1707 in 2007:
Defending the Revolution, Defeating the Jacobites,” Journal of British Studies 49, no. 1 (January
2010): 28–46. On Ireland, see L. M. Cullen, An Economic History of Ireland since 1660 (London,
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Table 1—Population Size in Britain and Ireland, 1700–1851
England Ireland Scotland Wales Total
Population (millions):
1700 5.0 1.8 1.1 .4 8.3
1801 8.4 5.2 1.6 .6 15.8
1851 16.9 6.6 2.9 1.0 27.4
Compound annual rate of growth:
1700–1801 .51 1.07 .40 .29 .64
1801–51 1.42 .46 1.18 1.25 1.12
% total:
1700 60.5 21.7 13.0 4.7 100.0
1801 53.1 33.2 10.2 3.7 100.0
1851 61.8 23.9 10.6 3.7 100.0
Territorial size:
Acres (millions) 32.2 20.8 20.1 5.1 78.3
% total 41.2 26.7 25.6 6.5 100.0
Acres per person:
1700 6.4 11.6 18.7 13.1 9.4
1801 3.9 4.0 12.5 8.7 5.0
1851 1.9 3.2 6.9 5.1 2.9
Sources.—For populations for England 1700, Scotland 1801 and 1851, and Ireland 1801 and 1851,
see B. R. Mitchell, British Historical Statistics (Cambridge, 1988), 7, 11. For England and Wales, 1801 and
1851, see British Parliamentary Papers (BPP), 1852–53, vol. 86; and for the 1851 census of Great Britain,
number of inhabitants, see BPP, 1801–51, vol. 2. For Ireland 1700 and Scotland 1700, see R. A. Houston,
The Population History of Britain and Ireland, 1500–1750 (Basingstoke, 1992), 29, 30. For Wales 1700, see
John Williams, Digest of Welsh Historical Statistics, 2 vols. (Cardiff, 1985), 1:6.
differences in the experience of economic change in Britain and Ireland in the
period.

It should be noted that the conventional estimates for economic performance,
national income or product, exist for Britain but not, for want of evidence, sep-
arately for England, Scotland, and Wales. But an alternative demographic approach
that considers changes in population size, urbanization, and the size of the agri-
cultural labor force, powerfully developed by Wrigley, offers a way through this
impasse.
26 Save for England, statistics of population growth and urbanization in
Britain and Ireland before the ﬁrst census in 1801 should be considered as rough
estimates or best guesses, but nonetheless, as table 1 shows, the numbers are very
suggestive.
England comprises just over 40 percent of the total surface area of Britain and
Ireland. Yet, in 1700 it had over 60 percent of the population of those islands,
giving it a population density of about twice that of Ireland and Wales and three
times that of Scotland. Though the population of all four nations grew in the
eighteenth century, about 46 percent of the total growth took place in Ireland.
26 E. A. Wrigley, “Urban Growth and Agricultural Change: England and the Continent in the Early
Modern Period,” Journal of Interdisciplinary History 15, no. 4 (Spring 1985): 683–728.314  HOPPIT
Table 2—Proportion of National Population in Towns of at Least 10,000
in Britain and Ireland, 1700–1851
England Ireland Scotland Wales
1700 13.4 5.3 5.3 .0
1801 24.0 7.4 17.3 1.7
1851 45.1 10.6 32.0 11.7
Sources.—For England 1700 and 1800, see E. A. Wrigley, People, Cities and Wealth:
The Transformation of Traditional Society (Oxford, 1987), 177. For Scotland and Ireland
1700 and 1800, see I. D. Whyte, “Scottish and Irish Urbanisation in the Seventeenth
and Eighteenth Centuries: A Comparative Perspective,” in Conﬂict, Identity and Economic
Development: Ireland and Scotland, 1600–1939, ed. S. J. Connolly, R. A. Houston, and
R. J. Morris (Preston, 1995), 16. For England and Scotland 1851, see Lynn Hollen Lees,
“Urban Networks,” in The Cambridge Urban History of Britain, ed. Peter Clark (Cam-
bridge, 2000), 3:70. For Ireland 1851, see W. E. Vaughan and A. J. Fitzpatrick, eds.,
Irish Historical Statistics: Population, 1821–1971 (Dublin, 1978), 3, 28–40. Wales 1700
is a guess on the basis that the largest Welsh town in 1801 was Swansea with 10,117; for
Wales 1801 and 1851, see John Williams, Digest of Welsh Historical Statistics,2v o l s .
(Cardiff, 1985), 1:62–65.
Strikingly, by the ﬁrst census of 1801 England and Ireland were equally densely
populated, both about two and three times as densely populated as Wales and
Scotland, respectively. Over the next half century, the populations of England,
Scotland, and Wales each roughly doubled, but terrible famine in Ireland in the
1840s reversed its growth, though it was still the second most densely populated
of the four nations in 1851. Despite signiﬁcant absolute growth, the share of both
Scotland and Wales of the total population of Britain and Ireland was slightly
smaller in 1851 than in 1700.
This picture of demographic change can be reﬁned a little by considering patterns
of urbanization (see table 2).
27 Ireland’s exploding population in the eighteenth
century was associated with only modest urbanization. In contrast, the less rapid
population growth in England and Scotland took place with considerable growth
of their great towns and cities. Notably, by 1851 Scotland was the least densely
populated of the four nations but the second most urbanized. Wales, however,
changed little in the eighteenth century in terms of either total population or its
distribution. But in the ﬁrst half of the nineteenth century, its population doubled,
and rapid urbanization had begun.
Such ﬁgures of population and its distribution show that the timing and patterns
of economic change in Britain and Ireland varied from nation to nation—and, of
course, from region to region, though there is not room here to develop that
analysis. In the context of the concerns of this article, the contrast in the eighteenth
century between Ireland and Wales is worth noting. Ireland’s population grew
vigorously, but that of Wales did not. Ireland urbanized somewhat, Wales hardly
at all. Without the beneﬁt of hindsight, it might be wondered which economy
was the more vibrant in 1800. Similarly, it is clear that English and Welsh economic
development took very different paths before 1801, despite the two nations sharing
27 The threshold of 10,000 persons for a town used here is, of course, a high one, and somewhat
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the same government. How, then, did parliaments legislate for economic change
across all four nations between 1660 and 1800?

Building upon earlier work done partly in collaboration with Joanna Innes,
counts of numbers and types of legislation are used to begin to explore the re-
lationship between the state and the economy. It is easy enough to identify the
18,761 acts passed by the parliaments at Edinburgh from 1660 to 1707 and at
Dublin and Westminster from 1660 to 1800.
28 Most acts can also be categorized
in terms of subject matter or where they were to apply, not least because most
were so speciﬁc, not that there is one agreed way of categorizing the subject matter
of acts, and some acts might straddle categories. Additionally, the true meanings
of others might require more research than has been undertaken.
29 Furthermore,
interpreting counts produced within any given categorization may not be straight-
forward. Joel Hurstﬁeld nicely hinted at the dangers when questioning G. R.
Elton’s enumeration of Thomas Cromwell’s legislative fertility under Henry VIII
when he observed that “I am myself reluctant to attempt to measure the quality
of parliamentary government by weight.”
30 Of course, one act might be momen-
tous, the other fairly trivial. Plainly acts such as the 1689 Corn Law were signiﬁcant
in ways in which a private estate act never was, but by keeping this in view, there
are meaningful patterns that can be identiﬁed that help to shed distinctive light
on the relationship in Britain (and Ireland) between parliaments and the economy,
of its multifaceted nature and the extent of national variation within Britain. Ini-
tially those ﬁndings are presented in a largely descriptive way; the following section
then seeks to explain the ﬁndings and tease out their signiﬁcance.
Unquestionably, Westminster’s capacity to enact legislation expanded dramati-
cally after 1688, indeed, to an extent that is still underappreciated.
31 In the ten
parliamentary sessions before then only 10 percent of attempts to obtain an act
succeeded. Thereafter regular, predictable, much better-ordered sessions saw the
success rate change profoundly, so that for most of the eighteenth century it was
around 75 percent. This contributed to an explosion in the numbers of enactments.
In the previous 200 years some 2,700 acts had been passed. In the period between
28 For acts passed at Dublin, see The Statutes at Large, Passed in the Parliaments Held in Ireland,
21 vols. (Dublin, 1786–1804). Short titles of both public and private acts prior to 1799 are listed in
the index volume, vol. 8. Private acts for 1799 and 1800 have been taken from Journals of the House
of Commons of . . . Ireland, vols. 18–19 (1796–1800). For Edinburgh, see The Acts of the Parliaments
of Scotland, 12 vols. (Edinburgh, 1820–75). Sources for acts passed at Westminster are Statutes at
Large, ed. Owen Ruffhead, 18 vols. (London, 1769–1800). Research for this article was undertaken
before the completion of both the Irish Legislation Database at http://www.qub.ac.uk/ild/ and the
Records of the Parliaments of Scotland Prior to 1707 at http://www.rps.ac.uk/.
29 Because of the numbers involved, most acts have been categorized on the basis of their short title.
For some questions about the categories employed, see Henry Horwitz, “Changes in the Law and
Reform of the Legal Order: England (and Wales) 1689–1760,” Parliamentary History 21, no. 3
(November 2002): 314–15.
30 Joel Hurstﬁeld, Freedom, Corruption and Government in Elizabethan England (London, 1973),
32.
31 Julian Hoppit, “Patterns of Parliamentary Legislation, 1660–1800,” Historical Journal 39, no. 1
(March 1996): 109–31; Julian Hoppit, ed., Failed Legislation, 1660–1800, Extracted from the Commons
and Lords Journals (London, 1997).316  HOPPIT
Table 3—Main Subject Matter of Westminster Acts, 1660–1800, with Proportion Designated
“Speciﬁc”
General Speciﬁc Total % Speciﬁc
Personal 11 2,828 2,839 100
Government 337 1,357 1,694 80
Finance 1,434 136 1,570 9
Law and order 414 155 569 27
Religion 117 256 373 69
Armed services 504 32 536 6
Social issues 131 578 709 82
Economy 825 2,453 3,278 75
Communications 107 2,486 2,593 96
Miscellaneous 47 9 56 16
Total 3,927 10,290 14,217 72
1688 and union with Ireland in 1801, over 13,600 acts were passed, marking a
rise from an average of under 15 per annum to an average of over 290 per annum
in the 1790s, or a nearly twentyfold increase.
The eighteenthcenturywasaneraofunprecedentedandextraordinarylegislative
fruitfulness at Westminster, but how much did all this legislation weigh? This can
be approached by trying to assess what each act broadly attempted to do in terms
of place, subject, and scope. For the last of these criteria acts have been distin-
guished between those that appear to have applied across at least one of the four
nations (classed as general) and those of more limited scope, very largely relating
to individuals and particular places (classed as speciﬁc). As in all such schemes,
some cases straddle the divide, but these are very few in number. (The formal
contemporary distinction between public and private legislation inconsistently re-
ﬂected the scope of legislation and so is not used here.)
Between 1660 and 1800 Westminster passed 14,217 acts. Nearly 28 percent of
these can be classed as general, 72 percent as speciﬁc. In fact, the Glorious Rev-
olution led to the growth of all types of acts but particularly of acts that were
limited in their reach, the proportion of these rising from 64 percent between
1660 and 1688 to 73 percent thereafter. This is a vital distinction, but it needs
to be explored in relation to the subject matter of acts. To do this, each act has
been placed within one of ten major categories (themselves resting on many more
subcategories).
32
As table 3 shows, three categories accounted for a little over six out of ten of
all acts passed in the period: personal, communications, and the economy. As will
become clear, all three of these affected economic matters, with only the “ﬁnance”
category among the others potentially doing so, mainly because of public ﬁnance
measures. Crucially, legislation classed as “personal,” “communications,” and “the
economy” was overwhelmingly speciﬁc rather than general in scope.
Personal acts were dominated by two main types: those dealing with wealth,
which almost always concerned issues surrounding land ownership, such as mar-
riage or strict settlements, numbering almost 3,000, and those dealing with status,
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such as naturalization and dignities, numbering a little over 1,100. Economy acts
were similarly dominated by landownership; in this case, enclosure. Over 2,300
economy acts dealt with land issues, and a little over 500 concerned overseas trade,
but fewer than 500 addressed the other six subcategories combined. In the com-
munications category, there were nearly 2,000 road acts, usually relating to turn-
pikes, and over 600 relating to inland navigation, river improvement, and canals.
Four main points might be made about these general counts of Westminster
enactments between 1660 and 1800. First, speciﬁc economic interests secured an
unprecedented number of acts to aid their ambitions after 1688. Parliament pro-
vided vital authority, especially to reorder or redeﬁne property rights and improve
the infrastructure.
33 Second, in a number of areas Westminster rarely legislated
generally. For example, it passed separate acts for each of the more than 2,000
enclosures it endorsed, not a general enabling one that could serve in all instances.
Such measures were largely initiated by individuals or local bodies, motivated
largely by self-interested considerations, though they might be legitimated by
reference to the national good in ways similar to those social measures analyzed
by Innes.
34 Also important was that executive government rarely developed mea-
sures dealing directly with either agriculture or industry—the Corn Laws and some
attempts at regulation were the main efforts.
35 With regard to the economy, only
in the area of imperial trade, with the navigation acts, was there something that
approximated a policy or system.
36 In part this was because few contemporaries
would contemplate a more interventionist state domestically, but most would
countenance closer regulation of overseas trade by the customs service and Royal
Navy. Parliament would respond to proposals to enhance economic opportunities,
but relatively few such proposals were governmental. The third key point is related
to this last observation. As historians from the Webbs onward have shown, par-
liament created a huge number of local bodies or agencies in the eighteenth
century, not only for roads and enclosure but for the poor law, health care, charities,
33 See Julian Hoppit, “The Landed Interest and the National Interest, 1660–1800,” in Parliaments,
Nations and Identities in Britain and Ireland, 1660–1850, ed. Julian Hoppit (Manchester, 2003), 83–
102; Dan Bogart and Gary Richardson, “Making Property Productive: Reorganizing Rights to Real
and Equitable Estates in Britain, 1660–1830,” European Review of Economic History 13, no. 1 (April
2009): 3–30; William Albert, The Turnpike Road System in England, 1663–1840 (Cambridge, 1972);
Eric Pawson, Transport and Economy: The Turnpike Roads of Eighteenth-Century Britain (New York,
1977).
34 Joanna Innes, Inferior Politics: Social Problems and Social Policies in Eighteenth-Century Britain
(Oxford, 2009), chap. 1.
35 1 William and Mary, c. 12 was the foundational statute for the eighteenth-century Corn Laws,
though based on earlier, lapsed, legislation; see D. G. Barnes, A History of the English Corn Laws
(London, 1930). The textile industries were subject to a range of regulation via legislation. Much of
it is listed in Raymond L. Sickinger, “Regulation or Ruination: Parliament’s Consistent Pattern of
Mercantilist Regulation of the English Textile Trade, 1660–1800,” Parliamentary History 19, no. 2
(June 2000): 211–32.
36 Surveyed in Kenneth Morgan, “Mercantilism and the British Empire, 1688–1815,” in ThePolitical
Economy of British Historical Experience, 1688–1914, ed. Donald Winch and P. K. O’Brien (Oxford,
2002), 165–91.318  HOPPIT
education, the urban infrastructure, and so on.
37 Again, this was almost always
done on a case-by-case basis, and even though these efforts might be short-lived
or time limited, they signiﬁcantly enriched and complicated the nature of local
governance. A centralized ﬁscal-military state was brought to fruition after the
Glorious Revolution, but there was also a substantial change in the architecture
of authority locally. Finally, some of this legislation, such as that concerning turn-
pikes and enclosure, involved compelling people to sell property and could take
away or alter the use rights of local people, making them more dependent upon
the market economy. Those people affected may have doubted that what they
judged as their property rights had become more secure.
38
Where did this legislation apply?
39 Nearly two-thirds of acts gave a clear indi-
cation of their geographical scope—ranging from particular buildings to nations
and portions of empire. Of those that did not, rather more were, in absolute terms,
general than speciﬁc in scope. Relatively, however, 70 percent of general acts did
not make their reach explicit in their titles, whereas only 23 percent of speciﬁc
acts were similarly vague. Presumably most of the unspeciﬁed general acts affected
the whole of England and Wales before 1707 and the whole of Britain thereafter.
While some acts did purport to affect only England or Scotland or Wales, numbers
were never great, and the distinctions between England and Wales are compro-
mised by sloppy draftsmanship before 1746 when it was enacted that with regard
to “England...t h esame has been and shall henceforth be deemed and taken
to comprehend and include the dominion of Wales, and town of Berwick upon
Tweed.”
40 Consequently, at this stage it is much more meaningful to pursue the
topic of the national patterns of acts passed at Westminster by focusing upon
speciﬁc legislation only. I return to legislation that might be considered British in
scope later.
The evidence in table 4 is complicated a little by the large number of speciﬁc
acts that have not been placed within a geographical category. Often these related
to particular individuals, as with those concerning naturalization or estates. De-
tailed work could doubtless allow many to be categorized, but probably the over-
whelming majority would be placed within “England.” With this caveat in mind,
the meaning of table 4 needs little elaboration. Local and personal interests in
England obtained legislation at Westminster in very much greater numbers than
those in Scotland or Wales (or Ireland).
The position of Wales is worth pondering, given that its government was so
similar to that of England after the abolition of the Council of Wales and the
Marches in 1689. Westminster passed 192 acts clearly relating only to Wales or
37 Sidney Webb and Beatrice Webb, English Local Government from the Revolution to the Municipal
Corporation Act: Statutory Authorities for Special Purposes (London, 1922); Paul Langford, Public Life
and the Propertied Englishman, 1688–1798 (Oxford, 2001); Stuart Handley, “Local Legislative Initia-
tives for Economic and Social Development in Lancashire, 1689–1731,” Parliamentary History 9, no.
1 (March 1990): 14–37; Innes, Inferior Politics, chap. 3.
38 I address the question of the security of property rights in Julian Hoppit, “Compulsion, Com-
pensation and Property Rights in Britain, 1688–1833,” Past and Present, no. 210 (2011): 93–128.
39 This question has been well explored in Joanna Innes, “Legislating for Three Kingdoms: How
the Westminster Parliament Legislated for England, Scotland and Ireland, 1707–1830,” in Hoppit,
Parliaments, Nations and Identities, 15–47.
40 20 George II, c. 42, § 3.THE NATION, THE STATE, AND THE FIRST INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION  319
Table 4—Speciﬁc Acts Passed at Westminster by
“Nation,” 1660–1800
Total %
England 7,189 69.9
Ireland 196 1.9
Scotland 304 3.0
Wales 184 1.8
British Empire 27 .3
Other 19 .2
Not stated 2,371 23.0
Total 10,290 100.1
parts thereof between 1660 and 1800. Of these just eight were general in scope:
six related to issues of law and order and two to government. (Governmental
measures usually applied to England and Wales or to Britain.) That is, almost all
legislation classed as Welsh was speciﬁc in scope and the response to applications
made by the propertied. Only ﬁfty-one such speciﬁc acts were passed between
1660 and 1760, but in the ﬁnal forty years of the eighteenth century 133 were
passed. That growth was overwhelmingly caused by heightened numbers of acts
for communications and the economy. Before 1760 they accounted for only 14
percent of all acts relating to parts of Wales (71 percent of such acts were personal);
after 1760 they accounted for 82 percent. But whereas for England between 1760
and 1800 the volume of enclosure legislation surpassed that for turnpikes, in Wales
the reverse was true, albeit at very much lower levels.
41 Some possible explanations
for this are offered later.
Even more than Wales, relative to population, Scottish speciﬁc interests secured
remarkably few acts at Westminster between 1707 and 1800. As shown above, in
this period England’s population was about ﬁve times that of Scotland, but its
speciﬁc interests obtained over twenty-three times more legislation than those of
Scotland. Previously, however, speciﬁc Scottish interests had obtained legislation
from the Edinburgh parliament much more frequently. Between 1660 and union
in 1707 the Edinburgh parliament was highly active, passing over 2,200 acts,
compared to nearly 1,900 at Westminster in the same period, only three of which
related to Scotland. Given Scotland’s small population and lack of colonies or
empire, this hints that legislation played a somewhat different role north and south
of the border before 1707. In Scotland, even more than England and Wales, it
was often extremely particular in complexion. Nonetheless, though nearly three-
quarters of the legislation was speciﬁc in scope, the Glorious Revolution led to
an important change in the pattern, as table 5 shows.
The average annual rate of legislation passed at Edinburgh remained steady on
either side of the revolution, but after 1688–89 signiﬁcantly more of it was general
in scope—a rise from an annual average of eleven to seventeen acts—and there
was also a steep decline both absolutely and relatively in numbers of personal
legislation, falling from nearly one-third to under one-ﬁfth of legislation. This was
41 It should be noted that turnpikes were usually authorized for twenty-one years, requiring new
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Table 5—Number of Edinburgh Acts, by Scope, 1660–1706
General Speciﬁc % Speciﬁc
1660–88 (29 years) 319 1,069 77
1689–1706 (18 years) 321 508 61
Table 6—Comparison of Legislation at Edinburgh and Westminster,
1660–1707
1660–88 1689–1707
Edinburgh acts, annual average 47.9 46.1
Westminster acts, annual average 19.4 72.1
Edinburgh acts, % general 23.0 38.7
Westminster acts, % general 36.3 31.6
a very different pattern from that at Westminster, as table 6 shows. The parliament
at Edinburgh had been more closely controlled by the executive before the rev-
olution, but once that weakened, thereafter legislators were better able to address
more general matters, including establishing a standing committee for trade.
42 By
subject matter, almost all types of acts became more general and less speciﬁc.
However, while numbers of acts relating to the economy grew more quickly than
for any other subject after 1688, the change to more general legislation was less
marked. Before then there were 254 acts in this category, with 14 percent of them
general. Afterward there were 231 acts, some 20 percent of them general. The
particular driver here was obtaining acts to regulate local markets. There is no
denying the legislative fecundity of the Edinburgh parliament in this period and
that there were signiﬁcant changes in the nature of what was enacted. Yet, despite
this, the Edinburgh parliament was voted out of existence.
43
A signiﬁcant number of Scots had been in favor of the union, largely on the
economic grounds that it would remove almost all barriers to doing business across
England and its empire.
44 This beneﬁt they gradually came to exploit to the full.
But importantly, in the eighteenth century they rarely turned to Westminster to
provide further legislative underpinnings to bring about change, certainly less often
than might have been expected. Of legislation passed at Westminster from 1707
to 1800, which made clear its local, regional, or national relevance, only 464 acts,
or under 6 percent, related only to Scotland as a whole or in part—160 general
42 Keith M. Brown and A. J. Mann, “Introduction,” in The History of the Scottish Parliament, ed.
Keith M. Brown, 3 vols. (Edinburgh, 2004–10), 2:52.
43 Generally, see Brown, The History of the Scottish Parliament, vol. 2; C. S. Terry, The Scottish
Parliament: Its Constitution and Procedure, 1603–1707 (Glasgow, 1905).
44 In addition to the works cited in n. 25 above, see also T. C. Smout, “The Anglo-Scottish
Union, 1707, 1: The Economic Background,” Economic History Review 16, no. 3 (April 1964):
455–67; C. A. Whatley, “Economic Causes and Consequences of the Union of 1707: A Survey,”
Scottish Historical Review 68, no. 2 (October 1989): 150–81; T. M. Devine, “The Union of 1707 and
Scottish Development,” Scottish Economic and Social History 4 (1984): 23–40.THE NATION, THE STATE, AND THE FIRST INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION  321
Table 7—Number of Dublin Acts, by Scope, 1660–1800
General Speciﬁc % Speciﬁc Total
1660–88 41 17 29 58
1689–1714 140 74 35 214
1714–60 330 186 36 516
1760–82 302 183 38 485
1782–1800 788 266 25 1,054
Totals, 1660–1800 1,601 726 31 2,327
acts, 304 speciﬁc.
45 Under the revolution constitution, the Edinburgh parliament
passed an average of forty-six acts per year, but between 1707 and 1800 there
were only ﬁve per year addressing exclusively Scottish matters—though some of
the many “not stated” would also have done so but probably not in any great
number.
If legislation relating to Scotland shrank dramatically after the union, there are
nonetheless some other general points to be made. First, while a little more of
this was speciﬁc rather than general in scope compared to that passed at Edinburgh
before the union, there was still relatively more general legislation than that passed
at Westminster as a whole (one-third compared to one-quarter). Moreover, the
subject matter involved was more widely distributed than for England. Crucially,
Scottish landowners did not turn to Westminster for legislation to reorder or
enclose their estates: only to undertake urban and infrastructural improvement did
Scottish interests seek acts at Westminster with any frequency.
A comparison can now usefully be made between the legislative activities of the
Dublin and Westminster parliaments.
46 As in England and Scotland, from one
perspective Ireland’s parliament was energized by the Glorious Revolution. Having
passed only 58 acts between 1660 and 1666, it did not meet again until the
revolution, thereafter usually meeting biennially. This enabled it to pass over 2,200
acts before union in 1801, a huge increase, but only about one-sixth the number
passed at Westminster, even though in 1800 Ireland’s population was nearly one-
half that of Britain’s.
Unsurprisingly, there were important differences in the character of legislation
passed at Dublin and Westminster. As table 7 shows, at Dublin general legislation
purporting to affect the whole island, or very large parts of it, predominated,
accounting for 69 percent of acts passed between 1689 and 1800, whereas just
27 percent of acts passed at Westminster were general. Most legislation passed in
Dublin in this period was, therefore, much more governmental in nature, relating
to public ﬁnance; the economy, particularly overseas trade; and law and order. Put
another way, recalling the earlier discussion, at Westminster around 60 percent of
45 A number of historians have stated that Westminster passed only nine acts relating speciﬁcally to
Scotland between 1727 and 1745; e.g., J. S. Shaw, The Management of Scottish Society, 1707–1764:
Power, Nobles, Lawyers, Edinburgh Agents and English Inﬂuence (Edinburgh, 1983), 126; Devine, “The
Union of 1707 and Scottish Development,” 30. It may be that what is meant is that only nine acts
related to the whole of Scotland, but twenty-eight acts relating only to Scotland were passed in those
years, many of them public and general, and eighty-one acts between 1707 and 1745.
46 See also David W. Hayton, “Introduction: The Long Apprenticeship,” Parliamentary History 20,
no. 1 (February 2001): 1–26.322  HOPPIT
acts fell under three main headings: personal, economy, and communications. At
Dublin these accounted for only 43 percent of acts, and in the case of the economy
acts, the subcategory of “the land” accounted for only one in twelve, compared
to two out of every three at Westminster. Yet, private economic interests did look
to the Dublin parliament for statutes. For example, just as in Britain, acts of the
Dublin parliament were used to authorize river and road improvement.
47 That is
to say, there is no reason to suppose that Irish economic interests were unable to
get the sorts of speciﬁc legislation they might have wanted. Indeed, arguably they
could obtain legislation more easily than their Scottish counterparts.

Between 1660 and 1800 the parliaments of Britain and Ireland passed 18,761
acts, with nearly 90 percent of this legislation occurring after the Glorious Rev-
olution. Westminster accounted for nearly 76 percent of all legislation passed by
the three parliaments, but both the Edinburgh and Dublin parliaments were no-
tably active between 1688 and their abolitions. Yet, little legislation passed at
Westminster in the eighteenth century dealt with Scotland or Wales, while the
legislation passed at Dublin was far more general in scope. Put most simply, speciﬁc
propertied interests in England sought legislation in much greater numbers than
such interests in the other three nations, even when allowance is made for differ-
ences in population and territorial size.
Part of the explanation for this lies in the relative signiﬁcance of propertied
interests across the four nations.
48 Because England’s economy was much larger
and better developed, it had many more interests that might seek legislation to
further their ambitions than in the other three nations: demand was both absolutely
and relatively greater. For example, there is no reason to suppose that propertied
interests in Wales were reluctant to seek legislation at Westminster. They had local
MPs available to help them, and, unlike Ireland and Scotland, Wales was not seen
as a threat by the English. That is, the relatively low numbers of acts relating
speciﬁcally to Wales, and their distribution over time and by subject, likely reﬂected
the nature of the Welsh economy and the production of opportunities and prob-
lems that the propertied might have sought to exploit or solve via legislation. The
most signiﬁcant explanation is that much land in Wales was already enclosed be-
cause of the greater relative extent of pastoral agriculture. Moreover, pastoralism
perhaps afforded fewer opportunities to develop rural domestic industries (helping
to account for the lower population density in Wales) and, thereby, created less
pressure for interregional trade and infrastructural improvement.
49 Only much later
than in England did Welsh roads begin to look in need of improving via turnpikes.
47 Ruth Delaney, Ireland’s Inland Waterways (Belfast, 1986); DavidBroderick,TheFirstTollRoads:
Ireland’s Turnpike Roads, 1729–1858 (Cork, 2002).
48 “Propertied interests” is obviously a catchall term, including owners of land, businesses,andrights,
but there is not space here to differentiate them nor to consider the various ways they sought to attain
their ends.
49 Frank Emery, “Wales,” in The Agrarian History of England and Wales, ed. Joan Thirsk, 8 vols.
(Cambridge, 1967–2000), 5, pt. 1:393–428. The suggestions in Giraldus Cambrensis, Proposals for
Enriching the Principality of Wales: Humbly Submitted to the Consideration of his Countrymen (London,
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Wales’s position under the revolution constitution was no different to that of
England, but, because of the nature of its society and economy, it was unable to
exploit the beneﬁts of parliament’s greater accessibility after 1688 until very much
later.
Such factors can clearly also be extended to Ireland and Scotland, for in very
general terms both economies were less successful than England’s. But other con-
siderations may also have been at work in the Scottish case. Four important reasons
for the seemingly hesitant use by Scots of the Westminster parliament after 1707
might be emphasized. First, the English showed relatively little interest in gov-
erning Scotland after the union, and indeed, except for matters of security, tended
to neglect it.
50 This suited many propertied interests north of the border, who
were happy with such semi-independence or “salutary neglect.”
51 Second, the
Scottish were distant from and a minority at Westminster. It was more difﬁcult
and costly for them to use it than their English or Welsh counterparts, and perhaps
they were less optimistic about legislative proposals being heard sympathetically.
Third, and closely related, in certain areas they had less need to request legislation
because there were authorities more easily to hand, speciﬁcally the Convention of
the Royal Burghs, the General Assembly of the Church of Scotland, and the Court
of Session. So, for example, the Convention of the Royal Burghs, a representative
assembly for dozens of towns and cities in Scotland, which, despite enjoying con-
siderable trading privileges, had been in decline before the union, was somewhat
revived thereafter because of its convenience as a forum for the airing of grievances
and ambitions and, critically, because it had some teeth—it passed what were called
acts. As Harris noted, it “constituted a national lobbying body for Scottish eco-
nomic interests of considerable scope and sophistication.”
52 Perhaps by providing
such a focal point and being willing to engage with executive government in
London, the convention aided the consolidation of issues, helping thereby to
explain the rather higher proportion of legislation relating to Scotland that was
general in scope when compared to all Westminster legislation. Finally, Scottish
law, which of course continued to be quite separate from English law after the
union, sometimes already provided the propertied with what their English coun-
terparts could only dream of. Thus, not a single enclosure act was passed with
regard to Scotland between 1707 and 1800—there were over 2,000 for England
and Wales—because of the greater power and concentration of Scottish landowners
(“Scottish landowners were the most absolute in Britain”) and, crucially, because
they could use general enclosure acts passed at Edinburgh in the seventeenth
50 The most concerted effort by the government in London to legislate for Scotland followed the
failure of the Jacobite rising in 1746. See B. F. Jewell, “The Legislation Relating to Scotland after the
’45” (PhD diss., University of North Carolina, 1975). More generally, P. W. J. Riley, The English
Ministers and Scotland, 1707–1727 (London, 1964); Shaw, The Management of Scottish Society.
51 J. A. Henretta,“SalutaryNeglect”:ColonialAdministrationundertheDukeofNewcastle(Princeton,
NJ, 1972).
52 Theodora Pagan, The Convention of the Royal Burghs of Scotland (Glasgow, 1926); T. Keith,
“The Inﬂuence of the Convention of the Royal Burghs of Scotland on the Economic Development
of Scotland before 1707,” Scottish Historical Review 10 (1913): 250–71; Bob Harris, Politics and the
Nation, 63, and also “The Scots, the Westminster Parliament, and the British State in the Eighteenth
Century,” in Hoppit, Parliaments, Nations, and Identities, 124–45.324  HOPPIT
century.
53 Both the third and fourth factors here introduce the important consid-
eration that propertied interests could seek state-sanctioned authority from else-
where than parliament.
In Ireland too there was virtually no enclosure legislation, and levels of legislation
were relatively low even though the Dublin parliament continued to legislate until
the union with Westminster took effect in 1801. There are obvious enough reasons
for this, relating to highly unequal patterns of landownership in Ireland, the
strength and extent of the pastoral economy, the restrictions formally in place
against the Catholic majority and Presbyterian minority, and, until 1782, the clear
subservience of the Dublin parliament to Westminster and Whitehall. Not only
under the terms of Poynings’s law, dating back to 1495, did legislation proposed
at Dublin have to be cleared in London but in 1720 Westminster’s Declaratory
Act claimed a historic and continuing right to legislate for Ireland.
54 Westminster
had indeed long been doing this and passed over 270 acts relating to Ireland
between the revolution and the abolition of the Dublin parliament (compared to
just three relating to Scotland between 1660 and 1707). If over a hundred of
these were personal acts, probably explained by the Anglo-Irish nature of the
landowners involved, most of the remainder related to the governance of Ireland,
especially its security and its economy, especially that the Irish economy should
not compete with England’s. In these two fundamental regards Ireland was seen
as a threat at Westminster. Irish cattle and woolens were considered especially
dangerous to English interests, leading to their exclusion from England and
Wales.
55 Ireland thus fell under one crown but, unlike the other three nations,
two parliaments.

The signiﬁcance of the volume of speciﬁc legislation is not, of course, the whole
of the story of the relationship between the nation, the state, and economic change
in Britain before 1800. Clearly, some general legislation was vitally important, and
some of it was or came to be British. Perhaps this was most true in the area of
regulating overseas trade. The Scots were brought within England’s empire from
1707, gradually allowing them to forget the Darien catastrophe of less than a
decade earlier. The Act of Union was quickly distributed to colonial governors,
with instructions that it be strictly observed, though ideas of Britishness were not
yet invoked: they were told that “Scotchmen are...t ob elooked upon for the
53 The quotation is from T. C. Smout, “Scottish Landowners and Economic Growth, 1650–1850,”
Scottish Journal of Political Economy 11 (1964): 218; Hoppit, “The Landed Interest,” 94–95; T. M.
Devine, “The Great Landowners of LowlandScotlandandAgrarianChangeintheEighteenthCentury,”
in Scottish Power Centres from the Early Middle Ages to the Twentieth Century, ed. Sally Foster, Allan
Macinnes, and Ranald MacInnes (Glasgow, 1998), 147–61.
54 James Kelly, Poynings’ Law and the Making of Law in Ireland, 1660–1800 (Dublin, 2007); I.
Victory, “The Making of the 1720 Declaratory Act,” in Parliament, Politics and People: Essays in
Eighteenth-Century Irish History, ed. Gerard O’Brien (Dublin, 1989), 9–29.
55 Carolyn A. Edie, “The Irish Cattle Bills: A Study in Restoration Politics,” Transactions of the
American Philosophical Society 60, no. 2 (February 1970): 1–66; Hugh F. Kearney, “The Political
Background to English Mercantilism, 1695–1700,” Economic History Review 11, no. 3 (April 1959):
484–96; P. H. Kelly, “The Irish Woollen Export Prohibition Act of 1699: Kearney Re-visited,” Irish
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future as Englishmen to all intents and purposes whatsoever.”
56 Another good
example of practical political economy that affected Britain as a whole would be
the protection afforded to textile producers by bans on imported printed calicoes.
57
Other such measures might be cited.
But not all economic legislation that purported to apply across Britain actually
did so. As has already been noted, the efﬁcient ﬁscal-military state depicted by
Brewer was English, not British. There is mounting evidence of the extent of
evasion well into the second half of the eighteenth century, especially on the coasts
of the Irish sea, with the Isle of Man playing a pivotal role until 1765.
58 Similarly,
union may have created the largest free-trade area in Europe, but its requirement
that English standards of weights and measures be applied across Britain was often
ignored before the introduction of the “imperial system” in 1824. For example,
in Scotland corn often continued to be measured not by the Winchester bushel
but by the boll, which varied considerably between Scotland’s counties. Much the
same was true of the “acre.”
59 In a related vein, some legislation that was apparently
British might particularly favor English or Scottish economic interests (Welsh in-
terests do not appear to have ﬁgured in such instances). Bounties provide several
telling examples here. Thus, the Corn Laws, made permanent as the ﬁrst major
piece of economic legislation after the Glorious Revolution, were modiﬁed at the
union to try to offer some beneﬁts to Scotland, but with little success. Over £6
million were spent on corn export bounties in the eighteenth century, very little
of it north of the border. As one informed Scottish commentator noted, “Scotland
has hardly been as yet in any respect beneﬁted by the British corn-laws; as these
laws have never yet been properly adapted to the nature and circumstances of that
part of the island.”
60 Rather, the reverse was true with regard to bounties on
ﬁshing, which again the union had sought to equalize across Britain, Anna Gambles
noting that “British ﬁsheries legislation seems to have privileged Ireland and Scot-
land through what amounted to regional ﬁscal subsidies.”
61 Another signiﬁcant
area of difference, albeit arguably more social than economic in its implications,
was the poor laws. There were well-known distinctions between England and
56 Calendar of State Papers, Colonial Series, 1706–1708, June, ed. C. Headlam (London, 1916),426–
27, 431.
57 Patrick O’Brien, Trevor Grifﬁths, and Philip Hunt, “Political Components of the Industrial Rev-
olution: Parliament and the English Cotton Textile Industry, 1660–1774,” Economic History Review
44 (1991): 395–423.
58 F. G. James, “Irish Smuggling in the Eighteenth Century,” Irish Historical Studies 12, no. 48
(September 1961): 299–316; L. M. Cullen, Smuggling and the Ayrshire Economic Boom in the 1760s
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and Eighteenth Centuries: Legal and Illegal Trade,” Economic History Review 35, no. 3 (August 1982):
354–72; R. M. Stott, “Revolution? What Revolution? Some Thoughts about Revestment,” Proceedings
of the Isle of Man Natural and Antiquarian Society 11, no. 4 (2003–5): 541–52.
59 JulianHoppit,“ReformingBritain’sWeightsandMeasures,1660–1824,”EnglishHistoricalReview
108, no. 426 (January 1993): 82–104.
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Wales, on the one hand, and Scotland, on the other, with James Anderson judging
in this case the advantage to the latter, the poor rates being “a burthensome tax,
fraught with many growing evils, which has a natural tendency to enervate in-
dustry.”
62 But there was also some variation between parts of Wales and England.
In 1770 the assize judges complained (interestingly to the Treasury) that in the
counties of Anglesey and Caernavon local magistrates “after our repeated Ad-
monitions, seem determined not to Execute the [Poor] Laws.”
63
Such variations sat alongside differences in levels of direct public spending on
economic projects. Contemporaries appreciated some of the economic weaknesses
of Scotland and Ireland, often feeling that greater public efforts were needed there
to compensate for the lack of private enterprise and, in the Irish case, Anglocentric
trade regulations. Crucially, the culture of improvement that was reasonably well
articulated in England by 1660 came over the next century to exert considerable
force in the other three nations.
64 Selﬂess and selﬁsh motivations were involved:
improvement patriotically sought to make one’s country as strong as possible, even
if the national origin of the ideas involved was immaterial, while higher rents or
proﬁts for individuals increased their chances of status enhancement. In England,
the selﬁsh motives were powerful because of reasonably widely diffused private
capital that was, where necessary, buttressed by acts of parliament provided by a
“reactive state.”
65 As has been seen, this was much less common in Ireland and
Scotland, but there the state was more willing and able to employ directly public
funds for economic ends.
Scotland received public funds at and after the union to stimulate the domestic
economy, funds that came to be particularly directed at the linen and ﬁshing
industries.
66 Article 15 of the union provided £2,000 annually for seven years to
encourage the woolen industry, ﬁsheries, and other manufactures. In 1718 a fur-
ther annuity of £2,000 was created, and from 1724 the surplus yield on the malt
tax was also to be made available. This prompted the Convention of the Royal
Burghs to argue for the funds to be administered by an independent body, leading
to the statutory creation of a Board of Trustees for Fisheries and Manufactures
62 Anderson, Observations,4 6 0 .
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Economy of British Historical Experience, 381–407; Peter Solar, “Poor Relief and English Economic
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1–22.
64 Paul Slack, From Reformation to Improvement: Public Welfare in Early ModernEngland(Oxford,
1999), esp. 80–81; Toby Barnard, Improving Ireland? Projects, Prophets and Proﬁteers, 1641–1786
(Dublin, 2008); Rosalind Mitchison, “Patriotism and National Identity in Eighteenth Century Scot-
land,” in Nationality and the Pursuit of National Independence, ed. T. W. Moody (Belfast, 1978),
73–95; T. M. Devine, ed., Lairds and Improvement in the Scotland of the Enlightenment (Dundee,
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Hitchcock, Tim Keirn, and Robert B. Shoemaker (Stroud, 1992), xi–liv.
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in 1727, with an initial budget of £6,000 per annum.
67 Attention soon focused
upon the linen industry, whose fortunes were signiﬁcantly enhanced with the
introduction of an export bounty in 1742 for British linens, in place (with a brief
hiatus in the 1750s) until 1832. The board expended £236,000 on the linen
industry and £150,000 on ﬂax production between 1727 and 1815.
68 Scotland’s
linen industry prospered under these stimulants, its output doubling every twenty
years from 1730 to 1800.
69
The considerable attempts to encourage the Scottish ﬁshing industry were rather
less successful. Governmental enthusiasm for this trade was very apparent between
the restoration and the union, with several acts passed at Edinburgh, though the
Royal Fishery Company established in 1670 was dismantled in 1690. In 1711 the
Convention of the Royal Burghs and the Board of Trade in London investigated
the Scottish ﬁshing industry but to little signiﬁcant effect. From 1727 the Board
of Trustees gave out premiums to encourage the Scottish ﬁsheries but gave this
up in 1742 because of the losses incurred.
70 In 1749 the Free British Fishery
Society was created by statute as a public-private venture to try to restart the
Scottish ﬁsheries in particular. The society’s capital came from private subscriptions,
but state bounties were provided to encourage both the building of shipping busses
and the export of herring. Initially successful, the society ran into serious difﬁculties
with the advent of war in 1756.
71 But £647,000 were spent in bounties for the
herring ﬁsheries in Scotland between 1765 and 1796.
72
Both before and after the union Scottish burghs often gained statutory authority
to impose further duties on the sale of beer to help fund urban improvements of
various sorts. “Scots burghs, by such means, gained less tightly constricted ad-
ditions to their disposable funds than English corporations ever did by their local
acts.”
73 Not all such funds were spent on projects to improve local economies,
notably markets and infrastructure, but a signiﬁcant amount appears to have been.
Moreover, other sources of public funds might be accessed. Thus, for example,
the port of Greenock, developed by Sir John Shaw and opened in 1710 at a cost
of £5,555, was paid for via a local tax on malt for 30 years.
74
Comparable developments to those in Scotland also took place in Ireland. If
Ireland lacked sufﬁcient private capital to lead to a large number of speciﬁc acts
to aid agricultural and infrastructural change, the public purse was very much
fuller, encouraging legislators in Dublin to fund various economic projects, often
through direct subsidies. The efforts made via the Linen Board (1711–1828) are
the best known of these. Established with funds arising from the excise on tea, it
67 R. H. Campbell, ed., States of the Annual Progress of the Linen Manufacture, 1727–1754 (Edin-
burgh, 1964), v–vii.
68 A. J. Durie, The Scottish Linen Industry in the Eighteenth Century (Edinburgh, 1979), 29, 164.
69 A. J. Durie, The British Linen Company, 1745–1775 (Edinburgh, 1996), 1–5.
70 Bob Harris, “Scotland’s Herring Fisheries and the Prosperityof theNation,c.1660–1760,”Scottish
Historical Review 79, no. 1 (April 2000): 39–60.
71 Bob Harris, “Patriotic Commerce and National Revival: The Free British Fishery Society and
British Politics, c. 1749–1758,” English Historical Review 114, no. 456 (April 1999): 285–313.
72 Report Respecting the British ﬁsheries (1798), 218–25, reprinted in House of Commons Sessional
Papers of the Eighteenth Century, ed. Sheila Lambert (Wilmington, DE, 1975), 118:506–13.
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also received effectively annual grants from 1721, totaling £247,340 by 1800.
75
The Linen Board was to encourage an industry judged well suited both to Irish
conditions and to English interests and, if not entirely successful, was in a way “a
remarkably progressive achievement for an eighteenth-century government,” an
“undeniable triumph.”
76 A similarly constituted and funded body to aid river
improvement, canal building, and agricultural development began life in 1729,
and some £900,000 of public money was spent on canals by 1787.
77 Many other
grants were also made, proliferating from midcentury. For example, in a two-week
period in the autumn of 1755 the Irish House of Commons received ﬁfty petitions
seeking “encouragement” for various projects, including twenty-six relating to
manufactures and thirteen to infrastructure. Grants totaling £55,800 were
awarded. Moreover, a raft of bounties were also provided to encourage various
areas of economic activity. As Conrad Gill nicely put it, “‘Parliamentary Colbertism’
had become as strong a force in Ireland as in any country in Europe.”
78 As yet
no overall ﬁgure is available for the amount of public ﬁnance pumped into the
domestic Irish economy in the eighteenth century by the Dublin parliament, but
it was certainly very substantial, dwarﬁng what was attempted in England and
Scotland. Yet, as Barnard has remarked, “how far into society the beneﬁts reached,
may be questioned”; certainly in the end such funds were unable to make up for
the lack of private capital.
79

I have tried in this article to heed S. R. Epstein’s cogent warning against pro-
jecting “backwards in time a form of centralised sovereignty and jurisdictional
integration that was ﬁrst achieved in Continental Europe in the nineteenth cen-
tury.”
80 It is, of course, tempting to see nationhood and state formation in Britain
between 1660 and 1801 as involving marked consolidation and centralization,
with England coming to exercise increasing authority over Ireland, Scotland, and
Wales, especially through the efforts of the sovereign parliament after 1688.
81
Certainly some such developments took place, but, as this article has shown, the
Glorious Revolution generated both centrifugal and centripetal forces. The leg-
islative activity of all three parliaments of the four nations was signiﬁcantly invig-
75 T. J. Kiernan, History of the Financial Administration of Ireland to 1817 (London, 1930), 165–
79; Harry Gribbon, “The Irish Linen Board, 1711–1828,” in The Warp of Ulster’s Past, ed. Marilyn
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76 Edith Mary Johnston-Liik, History of the Irish Parliament, 1692–1800, 6 vols. (Belfast, 2002), 1:
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77 Toby Barnard, The Kingdom of Ireland, 1641–1760 (Basingstoke, 2004), 88; E. Magennis, “Coal,
Corn and Canals: Parliament and the Dispersal of Public Moneys 1695–1772,” Parliamentary History
20, no. 1 (February 2001): 74.
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1925), 197.
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80 S. R. Epstein, Freedom and Growth: The Rise of States and Markets in Europe, 1300–1750 (London,
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orated after 1688, marking an important step in the evolution of Britain and Ireland
from a “multiple kingdom” to a “composite state” of unequal parts.
82
It was also the case that domestically the state in Britain was more multilayered
and multistranded than is usually appreciated, such that to focus only upon ﬁscal-
military or mercantilist considerations is to miss too much. Moreover, neither the
authority of the British ﬁscal-military state nor the pursuit or experience of leg-
islation was felt consistently across Britain (or indeed the four nations). The ap-
plication of general legislation was often patchy in national terms, but this article
has also stressed the need to consider all types of legislation—that parliament
inﬂuenced the economy through both broad and speciﬁc measures. The latter
were very numerous, collectively inﬂuencing economic activity profoundly and
extensively. But there were very clear differences in the scope and subject matter
of the legislation of the three parliaments; speciﬁc interests sought legislation at
all three, but this was much more marked in the case of the English at Westminster.
Crucially, Scotland, which had generated so much legislation before 1707, de-
veloped in the eighteenth century without resorting to Westminster for legislation
on a signiﬁcant scale. Moreover, if the explanation for its economic success is put
down to incorporation within England’s empire with union, then such an argument
plainly cannot be made in the Irish case after 1800. Before then, the Dublin
parliament was available to economic interests through the eighteenth century,
especially from 1782, and invested signiﬁcant amounts of public funds in schemes
for economic improvement, yet even then Ireland’s economy did not develop
along British lines.
83
The Welsh case has pointed to the need to take into account differences in the
demand for legislation from propertied interests, demand that reﬂected the per-
ceived potential of the underlying economy. From this perspective the state can
reasonably be designated as “reactive.” In turn, the power of political institutions
should not be exaggerated relative to fundamentals such as the geographical dis-
tribution of vital raw materials. But that does not mean that Westminster was a
neutral or passive institution that can be lightly discounted. Not only did it legislate
extensively relating to economic matters, but such legislation might be consequent
upon signiﬁcantly changing notions of property rights and market fundamentals,
as the cases of the Corn Laws, enclosure, and slavery attest.
A further crucial point suggested by this article is that the Westminster parliament
was not straightforwardly the sovereign power at the center of a single, unitary
jurisdiction. In practice it also sat amid other forms of authority, often quite strong
ones. The Scottish case is especially important here. Its propertied interests sought
relatively little legislation at Westminster. An important part of the explanation
appears to be due to the strength of other institutions closer to home, especially
the Convention of the Royal Burghs and the Court of Session. As yet very little
is known about the work undertaken in them, either in the round or in relation
82 J. H. Elliott, “A Europe of Composite Monarchies,” Past and Present, no. 137 (November 1992):
48–71; H. G. Koenigsberger, “Composite States, Representative Institutions and the American Rev-
olution,” Historical Research 62, no. 148 (June 1989): 135–53; David Hayton, “Constitutional Ex-
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83 Interesting points are made in S. J. Connolly, R. A. Houston, and R. J. Morris, “Identity, Conﬂict
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to economic activity, but it does seem reasonable to conclude that the strength
of Scotland’s civic institutions was indeed such that in this period “Scottish sov-
ereignty became modern and dynamic, but it was not associated with a parlia-
ment.”
84 Even in the case of England and Wales it is worth remembering that
many disputes over property might be resolved either by act of parliament or by
a chancery decree and that the latter were numerous both before and after 1688.
85
And if parliament made laws, judges applied them, often with considerable dis-
cretion, perhaps especially in Scotland.
86 The proliferation of statutes in this period
only increased the opportunity for judicial discretion.
Such complexities play, of course, upon broader visions of the trajectories of
British history. Britain has been an inherently multinational state since at least
1603 but not a unitary, federal, or confederal one. If it might be called a “union
state,” the nature of the union has gone through more substantial twists and turns
than is often acknowledged.
87 The Glorious and the industrial revolutions were
part of that, while the links (and, in places, the absence of links) from the former
to the latter bring out some of the meaning of the twists and turns. This can
suggest a very different view than both the old and the new Whig interpretation,
of ﬂuctuation as well as achievement; of divergence as well as of convergence; and,
in particular, of uncertainty and ambiguity in connections between the individual,
the nation, and the state. Mischievously, it might be recalled that, in fact, the
Whig interpretation always existed alongside that of “perﬁdious Albion,” of a
country inclined to kill its kings, abandon its allies, bully its neighbors, and posture
hypocritically.
88
This is not, however, to deny the distinctive nature of Britain’s history between
the late seventeenth and late eighteenth centuries. The consequences of the Glo-
rious Revolution and the growth of Britain’s economy in the eighteenth century
were unusual.
89 But a distinctive history is not necessarily an exemplary one. In-
deed, as O’Brien and Bates have argued, on a priori grounds it seems reasonable
to argue that Britain’s economic precocity made it ill suited to provide a guide
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for later industrial revolutions.
90 This article has provided considerable evidence
in support of such a revision, for the British state was multinational and multi-
layered in ways impossible to mimic. Not the least of its achievements was to
provide various ways in which political and legal power might be used to pursue
economic opportunities. If not all of those variations arose because of three or
four nations’ considerations, it is nonetheless clear that a single nation-state per-
spective is only a part of the story; better, indeed, to recognize the plurality of
Britain’s political economies.
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